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 The Effect of Market Structure on Cellular Technology
 Adoption and Pricing1
 By Katja Seim and V. Brian Viard*
 We examine how structural changes in the mobile telecommunica-
 tions industry between 1996, when local markets were duopolies,
 and 1998, when varying degrees of regulated entry had occurred,
 affected firms ' product offerings and nonlinear pricing strategies. We
 relate firms' digital technology adoption and the characteristics of
 their calling plan menus to the amount of entry in local markets. We
 find that entry induces firms to offer larger menus with more evenly
 spread plans, both directly and by accelerating the introduction of
 digital menus with such features. Prices decline with entry, in partic-
 ular for high-valuation consumers who benefit from steeper quantity
 discounts. (JEL Lil, L13, L96, L98, 033)
 carriers offered on average 5.9 different calling plans in a market in
 1996. By 2002, that number had increased to 17.5 before falling to 3.7 by
 2007. l In part, these changes reflect the introduction, and later elimination, of verti-
 cally differentiated services, such as different transmission technologies and sizes
 of calling areas. They also reflect adjustments in the carriers' use of second-degree
 price discrimination in response to factors such as increasing demand heterogeneity,
 increased availability of wireless spectrum, and changes in market structure.
 Only a few theoretical results and limited empirical research are available to inform
 how market structure affects firms' second-degree price discrimination strategies and
 consequent welfare effects. Even less is known about its simultaneous impact on firms'
 product offerings and use of price discrimination. This interaction has important welfare
 consequences in many empirical settings, particularly communications and information
 industries, such as wireless communications, Internet access, and content distribution.
 These industries experience frequent market structure changes through reorganizations
 or new entry, frequent product innovations due to technological change, and price dis-
 crimination based on menus of nonlinear price schedules.
 * Seim: The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 3620 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104 (e-mail:
 kseim@wharton.upenn.edu); Viard: Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business, 20/F, Tower E2, Oriental Plaza, 1
 East Chang An Avenue, Beijing, China 100738 (e-mail: brianviardi^ckgsb.edu.cn). We would like to thank Michael
 Grubb, John Johnson, and Li Xing for excellent research assistance, Anja Lambrecht, Philip Leslie, John Parapatt,
 and Catherine Tucker for helpful comments, and Dan Ackerberg for providing us with computer code for a related
 problem. This research was supported by the NET Institute and the Stanford Center for Electronic Business and
 Commerce.
 tTo comment on this article in the online discussion forum, or to view additional materials, visit the article page
 at http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi= 1 0. 1 257/mic.3.2.22 1 .
 1 Authors' calculations based on data from Kagan World Media and MyRatePlan.com, LLC.
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 In this paper, we assess the impact of market structure on firms' price discrimina-
 tion strategies, both directly, through competitive interaction, and indirectly, through
 its influence on how quickly firms market new services and discontinue old ones.
 We employ comprehensive, geographically detailed data on nonlinear pricing plans
 offered by wireless carriers in 1996 and in 1998. Between the two years, personal
 communication services (PCS) providers entered wireless duopoly markets and
 incumbents began introducing digital service that improved on the existing analog
 service in call features and spectrum management. In our setting we can assess the
 relative importance of the direct and the indirect effect, via technology adoption, of
 market structure on pricing. We find that the median indirect effect amounts to 33.45
 percent of the overall effects of market structure, reflecting that carriers provide both
 more plan variety and greater price decreases for the new than for the old technol-
 ogy. We find that indirect effects are less significant in affecting the spacing of plans
 along the usage spectrum.
 Theoretical work on the direct effect of competition (including Shmuel S.
 Oren, Stephen A. Smith, and Robert B. Wilson 1983; Esther Gal-Or 1988; Daniel
 F. Spulber 1989; and Lars A. Stole 1995) focuses on the relationship between the
 number of firms and the breadth and curvature of nonlinear price schedules. A com-
 mon finding is that greater competition leads firms to lower their price schedules
 toward marginal cost, increases consumer participation in the market, and reduces
 welfare distortions between high- and low-valuation consumers. Justin P. Johnson
 and David P. Myatt (2003, 2006) and Huanxing Yang and Lixin Ye (2008) consider
 the effect of changes in market structure when firms are horizontally differentiated.
 The implications of these papers depend on the initial level of competition (i.e., do
 firms directly compete or have local monopolies), making them difficult to relate to
 an empirical setting.
 Theoretical work relevant to the indirect effect of market structure via new prod-
 uct pricing focuses on the strategic determinants of product diffusion speed, specifi-
 cally the possibility that a firm would adopt a product preemptively to deter or delay
 adoption by other firms. Jennifer F. Reinganum (1981a, 1981b) points to two offset-
 ting effects: lower firm concentration increases the competitive pressure on an indi-
 vidual firm to gain a relative advantage early, but it also drives down post-adoption
 profits, inducing firms to wait for adoption costs to decline. Drew Fudenberg and
 Jean Tiróle (1985) imply that, when competition increases so too does technology
 adoption because there are more opportunities for firms to steal business. In aggre-
 gate, this literature yields inconclusive predictions for the effect of market structure
 on the speed of diffusion (see Heidrun C. Hoppe 2002 for a more extensive review).
 However, we show in the Appendix that by tailoring a model to the regulated entry
 observed in our setting, theoretical predictions are consistent with our empirical
 finding that entry accelerates adoption when incumbents' profits fall more when
 they remain with an old technology than when they upgrade to a new, substitute
 technology. We argue that the latter condition is likely to hold in our setting as well
 as in communications and information industries more broadly.
 Previous empirical results on the effect of market structure on adoption speed vary:
 Sharon G. Levin, Stanford L. Levin, and John B. Meisel (1987), Timothy H. Hannan
 and John M. McDowell (1984), and Massoud Karshenas and Paul L. Stoneman (1993),
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 respectively, find a negative, positive, and no significant relationship between market
 concentration and adoption speed. A difficulty in this previous work is accounting
 for unobserved drivers of both entry and product introduction strategies. The entry
 that occurred in wireless markets after 1996 resulted from regulatory intervention,
 which limits the role of unobserved profit shifters in determining market structure. In
 addition, the levels of entry experienced by 1998 varied across local markets because
 of exogenous differences in geographic and regulatory features that affect the time
 required to build a sufficiently dense transmission network. Our empirical finding of
 a positive relationship between market concentration and adoption speed thus benefits
 from a more controlled setting than was possible in previous work.
 We find that additional competition leads to increased price discrimination both
 directly, through increased plan variety, and indirectly, through quicker adoption
 and marketing of the new service, and that both effects are important. In markets
 with more competition, firms are more likely to upgrade and, if they do, phase out
 more analog calling plans and introduce more digital calling plans than their coun-
 terparts in less competitive markets. We show further that firms generally decrease
 the clustering of contracts more in markets with more entry, suggesting that they
 respond to intensified competition by attempting to steal business rather than by
 increasing customer segmentation.
 We also find that competition induces firms to tailor their offerings to the customer
 group whose demand is best served by their chosen technology. Incumbents who con-
 tinue to offer capacity-constrained analog service expand their share of low-usage
 plans more when facing more competitors. Digital entrants and incumbents who fully
 replaced analog with capacity-unconstrained digital service increase the share of high-
 usage plans more when facing more entry. High-usage customers also gain more from
 price decreases due to entry. Consistent with evidence provided by Meghan Busse
 and Marc Rysman (2005), we find that while firms reduce prices in general, quantity
 discounts are larger in markets with more entry. Competition again plays a direct role,
 with entry decreasing price, and an indirect role, with firms that offer digital plans also
 offering steeper discounts than their non-digital competitors.
 These results have important consequences for telecommunications regulation.
 In most countries regulators have a direct impact on market structure through licens-
 ing practices, spectrum allocation or auctions, and merger reviews. In doing so, it is
 important for regulators to consider the impact of alternative market structures on
 the improvement of existing technological standards and subsequent pricing. For
 example, in deciding how much spectrum to make available for wireless broad-
 band services, regulators should consider the incentives that ensuing competition
 will create for incumbents to phase out narrowband or upgrade existing broadband
 technologies and the menu of prices they offer. Similarly, the ongoing consolida-
 tion in the wireless industry may benefit consumers through improved call quality
 and coverage and cost savings generated by scale economies. However, our results
 suggest that increased concentration may also slow efforts to introduce next-gener-
 ation services and alter providers' pricing, with high- valuation customers being the
 most severely affected. Our results complement theoretical work emphasizing that
 regulators consider the role of substitutes in pressuring incumbents to upgrade their
 offerings (see Michael H. Riordan 1992).
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 Figure 1 . Major Trading Areas and Cellular Market Areas
 Notes: This map shows the geographic market areas for cellular service. The dark-bordered regions are the 5 1 MTAs
 and the light-bordered areas are the CM As. Shaded CM As denote the set of 100 largest cellular markets in 1996.
 I. Mobile Telecommunications Markets in the Late 1990s
 The US cellular phone industry originated in 1981, when the Federal
 Communications Commission (FCC) awarded two licenses per cellular market area
 (CMA) to provide cellular telephone services in 306 metropolitan markets and 428
 FCC-designated rural markets covering the entire country (see Figure 1). The duo-
 poly structure existed until the introduction of PCS.2 Between December 1994 and
 January 1997, the FCC awarded 2,074 PCS spectrum licenses, six in each mar-
 ket. The geographic market definition used for PCS spectrum differed from that for
 cellular markets. Fifty-one major trading areas (MTAs), shown inside bold-faced
 boundaries in Figure 1, divided the country into regions the size of multiple cities
 or states, which were subdivided into basic trading areas (BTAs) the same size as
 or slightly larger than the corresponding CMA. We utilize two snapshots of the uni-
 verse of residential wireless contracts from the 100 largest CM As (shown as shaded
 areas in Figure 1) provided by Kagan World Media to investigate how market con-
 duct changed with entry. The first snapshot was taken in February 1996, when all but
 two markets operated as duopolies,3 and the second in March 1998.
 Concurrent with the allocation of PCS licenses, Nextel Communications entered
 by transitioning from providing mobile radio services to offering wireless services.
 Nextel began a national rollout of its service in September 1996. By 1998, Nextel
 had entered 71 of the 100 largest cellular markets. Despite Nextel's initial focus on
 2 Cellular pricing under this duopoly structure is the topic of Philip M. Parker and Lars-Hendrik Roller (1997)
 and Busse (2000).
 ^The two exceptions are the Baltimore and Washington CM As, which we dropped from the estimation sample.
 Both markets experienced entry by three firms by 1998.
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 business customers, we treat it as a viable competitor to the cellular incumbents,
 similar to the PCS entrants.
 With the conclusion of the PCS auctions, cellular incumbents faced potential
 entry of one specialized mobile operator and six PCS providers. Two main factors
 drive the number of competitors actually operating in a market by 1998. First, due to
 the bankruptcy of several winning bidders in small business auctions, 347 licenses
 remained initially inactive and were re-auctioned only in April 1999. Second, there
 is a significant lag between license award and service initiation while the carrier
 builds a network of towers to broadcast signals of sufficient quality to its users'
 phones.4 This time lag is commonly referred to as the "build-out" delay. Since
 Nextel's network is cellular-like, similar build-out requirements constrained its roll-
 out of service. The time it takes to deploy service depends on endogenous market
 characteristics such as the potential subscriber base. Other characteristics, such as
 the market's geographic area and local land-use regulations that affect the difficulty
 and cost of constructing the required tower network, provide exogenous variation in
 the number of competitors across markets at a given time.
 Table 1 shows the entrants' launch dates by quarter for the largest 100 markets
 from 1995 to 1998. By March 1998, on average 4.31 providers offer wireless service
 in a CMA. Across markets, five cities had no entry, 25 cities entry by one firm, 27
 cities entry by two firms, 33 cities entry by three firms, and ten cities entry by four
 firms by 1998.
 The networks that the entrants built used digital technologies. Digital technolo-
 gies improved the efficiency of spectrum use and the quality and reliability of ser-
 vice. By allowing for new features such as call waiting and caller ID, they increased
 vertical differentiation in service provision. Prior to the introduction of digital tech-
 nology, vertical differentiation was primarily due to differences in call quality in the
 local calling area. The only significant horizontal differentiation was brand reputa-
 tion unrelated to vertical quality.
 As of 1998, digital service had a limited coverage area, which was frequently
 restricted to the user's local calling area since the providers' use of four incompatible
 technology standards increased the chance of inoperability when traveling.5 Initially,
 therefore, analog service continued to be attractive to low-usage customers or custom-
 ers who traveled frequently outside their local region. With the increased diffusion of
 digital technologies, however, demand for digital service quickly exceeded that for
 analog, with approximately 50 percent of subscribers using digital technologies by
 late 1999 (Cellular Telecommunications and Internet Association 2000).
 In 1996 the incumbents employed analog technology almost exclusively, and in
 rare cases immature digital technologies, and could choose to upgrade their existing
 analog networks to digital. Adding digital capabilities to an existing network usually
 involved minimal hardware additions at the towers along with software upgrades and
 a significant amount of system optimization. Frequently, incumbents did not require
 4 The FCC required PCS licensees to meet specific coverage requirements, amounting to providing adequate
 service to between 25 and 33 percent of the market's population within five years.
 5 The cellular and PCS providers used one of three digital technology standards, CDMA, TDM A, or GSM.
 Nextel used Motorola's digital iDEN technology.
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 Table 1 - Entrants' Activation of Systems by Launch Quarter in Top 100 Cellular
 Markets, Q4 1995-Q2 1998
 Quarter of Number of Average build-out time Average
 launch launches (months) market size
 Q4-1995 2 ¡TO 3,538,229
 l-1996 - - -
 Q2-1996 2 13.0 1,062,081
 Q3-1996 13 16.6 1,553,067
 Q4-1996 39 20.2 2,031,327
 Ql-1997 35 23.4 1,884,427
 Q2-1997 28 26.0 2,205,694
 Q3-1997 31 28.2 2,269,856
 Q4-1997 34 30.0 1,746,194
 Ql-1998 12 33.1 2,062,024
 Q2-1998 22 26.8 1,900,680
 Total 218 25.3 1,951,804
 Note: Average build-out times are computed for PCS entrants only as the delay between
 license award and system activation.
 Source: PCS Week, various issues, companies' public filings.
 any additional towers to provide digital service, which allowed them to avoid the zon-
 ing and other difficulties associated with identifying new tower locations that the PCS
 entrants faced. Cellular incumbents were thus able to roll out digital service quickly in
 response to changes in demand or supply.6 We characterize the upgrade made by such
 firms as an adoption decision followed by a fixed, brief implementation time.
 Incumbents' timing of and approach to digital deployment varied significantly.
 By 1998, 66.32 percent of all incumbents were offering digital calling plans; 7.77
 percent offered only digital plans within a market;7 and 58.50 percent gave custom-
 ers a choice between analog and digital technology by offering calling plans for
 both; 33.68 percent of providers had not yet begun digital deployment by 1998.
 During the sample period most providers held licenses to operate in only a small
 number of markets. Of the 24 cellular providers in the top 100 markets in 1996,
 fifteen firms operated in at most five of the top 100 cellular markets, and only five
 carriers offered service in more than fifteen markets. Because providers had to pay
 other providers to terminate or originate calls outside these limited networks, they
 offered only local calling plans during the sample period.8
 The calling plans consist of three-part tariffs. To evaluate carriers' nonlinear pric-
 ing we define a "plan family" as the set of plans offered by one carrier that dif-
 fer in their fixed fees and numbers of included peak minutes ("allowances") but
 have a common service technology and share other features, such as calling area
 and contract duration. Since regional and national plans were not available, a PCS
 6 See Jason Meyers (1997) for a more detailed description of the digital upgrade process.
 7 The FCC's rules require that all incumbent cellular carriers continued to provide analog service through 2008.
 However, the carriers are not required to offer or market new analog service plans. In contrast, other mobile tele-
 phony carriers such as the PCS providers are not required to provide analog service.
 8 With the gradual build-out of larger networks, carriers introduced calling plans with larger regional or national
 calling areas subsequent to our sample period.
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 provider in our data offers one digital "plan family" in a local market, while a cel-
 lular provider that has introduced digital service but continues to market analog
 service offers a choice of two "plan families."
 Table 2 shows that a plan family offered by the incumbents in 1996 consisted of,
 on average, 5.89 individual analog plans; the number of plans offered by a provider
 ranged from three to eight. By 1998, incumbents had introduced 128 digital plan
 families across the 98 markets, while continuing to offer 178 analog plan families.
 Relative to 1996, the number of plans in an analog plan family decreased by 0.07
 on average; however, the standard deviation of 1.92 plans reflects an uneven adjust-
 ment. A large fraction of providers offered both analog and digital plans simultane-
 ously, with their digital calling plan families consisting of 5.06 plans on average.
 Table 2 also shows the variation in fixed fees and allowances across plans in 1998.9
 This variation, together with the variation in entry and the clear definition of mar-
 kets in this industry, yields an attractive setting in which to test the effect of market
 structure on technology adoption timing and price discrimination strategies.
 II. Entry, Technology Adoption, and Nonlinear Pricing: Results
 Greater competition in cellular markets has the potential to change firms' non-
 linear pricing practices through two channels. With more competition, firms may
 adjust both the number of options offered to customers in their menu of plans and
 the placement of their plans. These are the direct effects of entry. At the same time,
 additional competition may change incumbents' incentives to adopt the digital tech-
 nology, leading them to make changes to the offered pricing menus if digital plan
 families differ from analog. These are the indirect effects of entry.
 We begin with a discussion of the effects of entry on plan introductions, before
 turning to an analysis of plan placement, investigating changes in placement overall
 and for customers of different usage types. We then quantify the overall effect on
 price levels. As we discuss our results, we relate them to the available theoretical
 predictions.
 A. Effect on Plan Introductions
 We first consider incumbents' incentives to introduce additional plans in response to
 entry. We use the change between 1996 and 1998 in the number of calling plans incum-
 bents offer to test whether they respond to changes in competition, either directly, by
 changing the size of plan families, or indirectly, by complementing or replacing exist-
 ing analog with digital offerings. We find that incumbents were more likely to increase
 calling plan variety for new or continuing technologies and to phase out additional
 calling plans for obsolete technologies in markets with more competitors.
 9The data include detailed calling plan descriptors, which confirm that changes in the menu of plans reflect the
 introduction or elimination of distinct calling plans. We focus on two key features of cellular contracts, the plan's
 monthly fixed fee and allowance. Along these two dimensions, the plan offerings differ significantly within each
 plan family.
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 Table 2 - Descriptive Statistics, 98 Largest Cellular Markets
 Obser-
 Variable vations Mean SD Minimum Maximum
 Incumbents 'plan family characteristics
 Number of plans in analog family, 1996 193 5.89 1 .30 3.00 8.00
 Change in the number of plans offered, 1996-1998 193 2.80 3.47 -5.00 12.00
 Analog plan families, if offered 178 -0.07 1.92 -6.00 5.00
 Digital plan families, if offered 128 5.06 1.58 2.00 9.00
 Share, analog plan families, 1998 306 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00
 Incumbents' plan characteristics, 1998
 Fixed fee, analog plans 1,017 72.06 64.87 9.95 592.99
 Allowance, analog plans 1,017 301.05 470.98 0.00 3,560.00
 Fixed fee, digital plans 713 73.24 47.96 14.95 279.99
 Allowance, digital plans 713 555.74 558.04 0.00 3,000.00
 Incumbents' technology choice by market, 1998
 Analog only (provider share)1 193 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00
 Digital only (provider share)1 193 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
 Mixed technology (provider share)1 193 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00
 incumbent characteristics
 Number of markets present 24 12.75 15.59 1.00 48.00
 Small network (provider share) 24 0.63 0.49 0.00 1.00
 Large network (provider share) 24 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00
 Market characteristics
 Population (000) 98 1,524.66 1,662.93 175.20 9,519.34
 Average commuting time (mins) 98 24.58 3.25 19.00 38.90
 Household income (000) 98 44.03 7.18 31.05 74.34
 Percent with BA or more 98 24.41 5.43 13.09 41.66
 Heterogeneity in commuting time 98 87.57 1.06 84.58 89.98
 Heterogeneity in income 98 92.46 0.23 91.68 93.09
 Heterogeneity in educational attainment 98 83.97 1.82 77.14 86.80
 Wharton Residential Urban Land Regulation Index 98 0.05 0.74 - 1 .28 1 .89
 Percentage of MSA area classified commercial 98 2.95 3.23 0.31 22.97
 1 The unit of observation is the market and provider, measuring the percent of firms that offer a given technology
 in the market.
 Econometric Model - We estimate a system of three nonlinear equations using
 full information maximum likelihood (FIML), which predicts the chosen adjust-
 ment in the size of the plan family and technology adoption while controlling for
 correlations in unobserved market attributes that render entry endogenous. Our esti-
 mation accounts for the discreteness of our data. We specify the change in number of
 plans between 1996 and 1998, which ranges from -6 to 9 in the data, for incumbent
 i in market m offering technology t G {analogy digital} as an ordered probit model:
 -6 xf [</, p лЬ] + ib < cu
 (l)APlansimt = i I if Cf < f[af,lf,Zb] + CL < Q+i> * = -5,...,8,
 9 ifCp9<f[ap,/f,ZL] +tìL
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 where the parameter Cp implies a cutoff for the unobservable f^mt that entails mov-
 ing from a change in plans of / - 1 to /.10 We allow the number of entrants to flex-
 ibly affect the change in the number of plans by estimating an effect that differs by
 technology and plan type, controlling for market characteristics:
 (2) /V,/?'ZL] = oř + ß'Prov_Techim + ßP2Plan_Typeim
 + ßP3(Prov_Techim)(Plan_Typeim)(Entrantsm) + ßiAXpm.
 Prov_Techim = [Prov_Analogim Prov_Mixedim Prov_Digitalim] are dummy variables
 indicating whether firm i offers analog-only, mixed, or digital-only technologies in
 1998, Plan_Typeim = [Plans _Analogim Plans _Digitalim] are dummy variables indi-
 cating whether firm /'s plan family is analog or digital, and Entrantsm is the number
 of PCS entrants by 1998.
 We follow earlier studies of the cellular industry, such as Busse (2000) and Eugenio
 J. Miravete and Roller (2004), to control for market demographics that affect firms'
 choices of plan variety and include these in Xfm. These include the CM A population
 (Popm) as a measure of market size, mean commuting time in minutes (Commute m)
 as a proxy for the additional value of a cellular phone to frequent drivers, average
 household income (Income m), and the educational attainment of the head of house-
 old (BA + m). Since plan variety reflects primarily demand heterogeneity, rather
 than size, we compute Herfindahl-type indices for the demographic variables in
 each market, representing the probability of two randomly selected CMA residents
 falling into the same demographic category.11 Table 2 provides descriptive statis-
 tics for the variables and Table 3 summarizes the variables and their sources. We
 also include firm fixed-effects in Xfm to control for firm-specific differences in the
 response to entry.
 We specify firm /'s decision to adopt digital technology as a probit model:
 (3) Digital* = ' [0 otherwise,
 controlling for firm and market factors that might affect adoption:
 (4) fD[aD,ßD,Zfm) = aD + ßD,Entrantsm + ß%BA + m + ß%Commutem
 + ßD,Popm + ßDblncomem + ß%LargeSci + ß?SmallSc,
 10 An alternative specification would be a count-data model. In our setting, the ordered response model has the
 benefit that it naturally allows for negative values of the outcome variable. See Colin A. Cameron and Pravin K.
 Trivedi (2005) for a discussion of the advantages of discrete choice models when modeling changes in counts, and
 Cameron and Trivedi (1986) for a comparison of the performance of ordered and count-data estimators. A downside
 to the ordered probit model is that extrapolation beyond the observed maximum change in plans offered is difficult.
 We focus on interpreting the effects of changes in the estimated parameters within the observed sample range of
 the plan change variable only.
 1 ' The incumbents' choices to introduce calling plans may reflect growth or increasing heterogeneity in market
 demand. Unfortunately, market-specific changes in the cellular subscriber base are not available.
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 Table 3 - Variable Description and Data Sources
 Variable Description Data source
 APlans Change in the number of plans of a given technology offered Kagan World Media
 by incumbents in each market.
 Plan-Family Herfindahl1 Herfindahl index based on share of minutes allocated to each
 calling plan.
 Share of high-usage plans Number of calling plans with an allowance above 1 80 minutes
 as a share of family's total number of plans.
 Prov_Analog Indicator: Provider offers only analog service in 1998.
 Prov_Mixed Indicator: Provider offers separate analog and digital plan
 choices in 1998.
 Prov_Digital Indicator: Provider offers only digital service in 1998.
 Plans_Analog Indicator: Plan family's technology is analog.
 Plans_Digital Indicator: Plan family's technology is digital.
 Entrants Number of entrants into the market by 1998.
 LargeSc Indicator: Provider offers cellular service in more than 15 of
 the top 100 cellular markets.
 SmallSc Indicator: Provider offers cellular service in at most 5 of the
 top 100 cellular markets.
 Pop CMA population in thousands. Census 2000
 Area CMA land area in square miles.
 Commute Average commuting time in minutes.
 Income Household income in thousands of dollars.
 BA + Percent of MSA population with at least a BA degree.
 Heterogeneity, time2 Heterogeneity index. Groups classify shares of workers by
 commuting time. Categories begin at 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35,
 40, 45, 60, and 90 minutes.
 Heterogeneity, income2 Heterogeneity index. Groups classify household shares by in-
 come in thousands, beginning at $10 to $50 in $5 increments,
 $60, $75, $100, $125, $150, and $200.
 Heterogeneity, educational Heterogeneity index. Groups classify shares of population
 attainment2 above 25 years. Categories are less than 9th grade; 9th-12th
 grade; high school graduate but no BA; BA or higher.
 %Comm Percent of CMA area with commercial establishment density Spatial Insights, Inc.
 of 70 or more per square kilometer (75th percentile in data)!
 WRI Wharton Residential Urban Land Regulation Index developed Saiz (2010)
 in Joseph Gyourko, Albert Saiz, and Anita Summers (2008).
 'The Herfindahl index is defined as Y,j=l j ((#/ - Ф-О/^у)2» where qj denotes the allowance on tariff у
 and #o = 0 < tfi <•<<?./•
 2 The heterogeneity indexes for commuting time, household income, and educational attainment are defined as
 1 - £ ¡(share of groupt)2.
 Digital im equals one if firm i adopted digital technology in the market by 1998.
 LargeSc and SmallSc indicate whether the firm operates a large or small network
 defined as more than fifteen and fewer than six markets, respectively. We also
 include provider fixed-effects, ßf isolates the effect of entry on the incumbents'
 adoption choices.
 Identifying the causal effect of entry on pricing and adoption is difficult since all
 three potentially reflect the attractiveness of a market in difficult-to-measure ways.
 If firms choose to build out less competitive markets first, this is likely similarly
 reflected in incumbents' pricing strategies or the attractiveness of implementing
 digital technology. For example, in markets with higher demand growth for cellular
 telephone usage we might expect faster entry and a greater chance of incumbents'
 upgrading to the digital technology, which allows for greater network capacity. This
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 could introduce a spurious correlation between entry and adoption behavior that
 does not represent a causal effect.12
 We control for the possibility of endogenous entry in two ways. First, we con-
 sider changes in the number of plans between 1996 and 1998, which removes any
 market-specific unobservable determinants of the incumbents' pricing strategies
 that are time-constant. Second, we instrument for the number of entrants in an aux-
 iliary model using measures of geography and land-use regulations that affect the
 build-out delay across markets, but are uncorrelated with the incumbents' adoption
 and pricing decisions.
 We specify the number of entrants, which ranges from 0 to 4 in the data, as an
 ordered probit model:
 'О iff[aE,ßE,ZEm] + eEm < CE
 (5) Entrantsm = i j if Cf < fE[aE,ßE,ZEm] + eEm < CE+lJ = 1,2,3
 ^4 ifCf <fE[aE,ßE,ZEm] + eEm9
 where the parameter Cf implies a cutoff for the unobservable e^ between y - 1 and
 j entrants and:
 (6) fE[aE,ßE,ZEm] = aE + ßEPopm + ßEPop2m + ßEAream
 + ßEWRIm + ßE%Commm.
 The market's potential subscriber base (Popm) has an ambiguous effect on entry.
 A larger potential market attracts entry, while making it more difficult to satisfy
 build-out requirements. We include the market area (Aream) and two measures of
 local land use and its regulation to capture the difficulty of build out. Typically, the
 local municipal land-use office must approve new cell towers prior to their construc-
 tion. Many local ordinances prohibit towers in residential zones, but allow them in
 industrial and commercial zones. Therefore, the stringency of local zoning laws
 directly affects the availability of appropriate tower sites in local markets and the
 cost and difficulty for a new entrant to build out a market. At the same time, local
 zoning laws should be uncorrelated with demand for cellular service or with incum-
 bents' digital technology adoption decisions since incumbents upgrade by convert-
 ing already existing towers, rather than having to site new towers.
 Our first land-use measure is the 2005 Wharton Residential Urban Land Regulation
 Index (WRIm) created by Gyourko, Saiz, and Summers (2008). This index is a sur-
 vey-based, standardized measure of the stringency of residential growth-control
 policies. We follow Saiz (2010) in aggregating the original municipality data to
 12 While we also control for a possible spurious correlation between entry and plan variety or placement, the
 theoretical mechanism underlying such correlation is less clear. The effect of market growth on the number of plans
 or their features is unaddressed in the theoretical literature, in which plan variety is determined by the heterogeneity
 of horizontal or vertical preferences or both but not by consumer density.
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 the CMA level. CMAs with high WRI values have zoning regulations or project
 approval practices that limit new residential real estate development, possibly result-
 ing in greater availability of candidate cell tower sites outside of constrained resi-
 dential areas. This should ease market entry.
 CMA-level commercial zoning data are unavailable. Instead, we use data obtained
 from Spatial Insights, Inc. on the number of establishments located in each block
 group to compute the share of a CMA's block groups that are likely zoned for mixed,
 commercial, or industrial use and therefore available as potential cell tower sites. To
 be conservative, we classify a block group as commercial if the density of establish-
 ments exceeds the 75th percentile in the data (70 establishments per square kilome-
 ter). The variable %Commm measures the percent of the total CMA area containing
 commercial block groups. Higher values of %Commm should be associated with
 easier market build-out and therefore entry.
 Single-equation ordinary least squares (OLS) and ordered probit models of the
 number of entrants as a function of the explanatory variables in equation (6) confirm
 that entry is associated positively and significantly with both WRIm and %CommmP
 The excluded instruments that affect neither the plan change nor the adoption deci-
 sion are also jointly significant in explaining entry. For the OLS specification, the
 partial F-statistic for the hypothesis that the instruments do not enter the entry equa-
 tion is 15.35, while the x2-statistic for the same hypothesis in the ordered probit
 model is 44.46.
 We assume that the plan change and adoption decision error terms can be decom-
 posed into a market and a firm-(technology-)specific component with (£mt = epm +
 Vto and & = eDm + r,?m where r¡pmt ~ N(0,1) and г£~Щ091). Normalizing the
 variance of е„ to one, we allow for a flexible correlation structure between market-
 level errors:
 /eDm' I i 0' loi aDP aDE'^
 (7) 'epm ~ N 0 1, aDP a' aPE .
 'em/ ' ' 0/ 'VdE °PE 1 / /
 eEm, e^ and epm are unobservable, market-specific factors that affect the entry, adop-
 tion, and plan change decisions, respectively, of all firms. The covariance terms
 allow for the kinds of correlations in the market-level unobservables discussed
 above. The Appendix contains details of the estimation approach.
 Direct Effects. - The left panel of Table 4 shows the results of estimating the
 system-of-equations FIML specification for equations (1), (3), and (5). Entry has a
 significant effect on the change in the number of plans offered by both analog-only
 and mixed-technology providers. Mixed-technology incumbents introduce more
 digital plans and phase out more analog plans in markets with more entrants and
 13 The estimates under these two specifications are similar to those in Table 4.
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 Table A - Change in Number of Plans and Digital Technology Adoption by Cellular Incumbents,
 1996-1998
 FIML OLS
 Standard Marginal Standard
 Coefficient error effect Coefficient error
 Plan change equation
 Providers' Type of Technology, 1998
 Prov.Analog -0.733** 0.363 -1.066 -1.422 1.097
 Prov.Mixed 0.025 0.331 0.037 0.113 1.020
 Plans_Digital 2.205** 0.240 3.208 3.016** 0.362
 Market Characteristics
 Prov_Analog x Entrants 0.126* 0.096 0.184 0.498** 0.222
 Prov_Digital x Entrants 0.037 0.143 0.054 0.268 0.429
 Prov_Mixed x Plans_Analog x Entrants -0.294** 0.098 -0.427 -0.442** 0.200
 Prov.Mixed x Plans_Digital x Entrants 0.293** 0.061 0.426 0.484** 0.083
 Population 3.5E-5 0.003 5.1E-5 0.004 0.010
 Heterogeneity, Commuting Time -0.052** 0.004 -0.075 -0.104 0.164
 Heterogeneity, Household Income -0.468** 0.003 -0.680 -0.720** 0.323
 Heterogeneity, Educational Attainment -0.002 0.006 -0.002 -0.015 0.068
 Digital adoption decision equation
 Market characteristics
 Entrants 0.566** 0.207 0.108 0.096* 0.052
 %withBA -0.039** 0.020 -0.007 -0.008 0.010
 Commuting time 0.019 0.026 0.004 0.006 0.016
 Population 0.038** 0.022 0.007 0.004** 0.002
 Household income 0.033** 0.017 0.006 0.011** 0.005
 Provider characteristics
 Large potential network 2.818** 0.496 0.538 0.190** 0.037
 Small potential network 2.065** 0.357 0.394 -0.263** 0.104
 Adjusted R2 (plan change, adoption) (0.739, 0.388)
 n (plan change, adoption) 306 (306, 1 93)
 Log-likelihood (FIML) -757.643
 Notes: Provider fixed effects included in plan change and digital adoption decision equations. Standard errors clus-
 tered at the provider level based on 50 bootstrapped samples for FIML estimates. For the FIML specification, the
 estimated coefficients of the entry equation with the corresponding standard errors in parentheses are:
 ENTRANTS =0.137 POP -0.001 POP2 +0.055 AREA +0.087 %COMM + 0.357 WRI + eE,
 (0.0210) (0.0002) (0.0162) (0.0196) (0.0987)
 with estimated covariances {o-DE,(TEp,crDp} and variances {cr2D,ap} of {0.181, -0.200, -0.256} and {0.488, 0.166}.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
 * Significant at the 10 percent level.
 both effects are highly significant. These incumbents introduce 0.43 digital plans
 and remove 0.43 analog plans for each additional entrant. This aspect of our results
 is complementary to work by Ron Borzekowski, Raphael Thomadsen, and Charles
 Taragin (2009) who find that direct-mail-marketing firms offer a larger number
 of distinctly-priced selection criteria, and thus price-discriminate more finely, in
 markets with more competitors. Incumbents who remain with the analog technol-
 ogy introduce 0.18 additional plans for each additional entrant. These effects are
 economically significant given means of 5.89 plans and 2.16 entrants in a market.
 The effect of entry on digital-only incumbents is positive but insignificant, perhaps
 because there are only fifteen observations to identify this effect. Of the demand
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 covariates, a one standard deviation increase decreases the number of plans in a
 market by 0.08 plans for commuting time and by 0.16 plans for income.
 The system of equations is identified without instruments because of the nonlin-
 earities of the ordered probit equation for entry. Since identification derives in part
 from the functional form assumptions for the errors, we also estimate an OLS model,
 displayed in the right panel of Table 4. The three significant entry effects under OLS
 are mostly in line with the corresponding marginal effects from the FIML results: an
 additional entrant in a market is associated with a decrease of 0.44 analog plans and
 an increase of 0.48 digital plans for a mixed-technology incumbent. The OLS esti-
 mates imply that analog-only incumbents introduce 0.50 plans for each additional
 entrant, while the results for digital-technology providers remain insignificant. Of
 the demand heterogeneity variables, only income heterogeneity has a significant
 negative effect on the change in the number of calling plans.
 Indirect Effects. - Entry also has a significant indirect effect on firms' pricing
 schedules by increasing the likelihood that an incumbent will transition to the digi-
 tal technology, thereby causing it to reduce the size of or phase out its analog plan
 family while introducing a larger family of digital plans. The lower panels of Table
 4 display the FIML and OLS results for the adoption equation. Entry positively
 affects adoption, with each additional entrant increasing the probability of adoption
 by 10.80 and 9.59 percentage points in the FIML and OLS cases, respectively.
 The FIML results indicate a U-shaped effect of firm scope on digital adoption,
 with large- and small-scope firms being more likely to adopt than medium-scope
 firms. Large-scope firms may benefit from cost savings associated with learning-by-
 doing or quantity discounts in equipment purchases. Small-scope firms, which are
 likely to attract consumers who travel less, are less affected by incompatibility of dif-
 ferent digital technologies outside their locale, and therefore have greater demand-
 side incentives to adopt earlier. Adoption is higher in more populous, wealthier, and
 less highly educated markets.
 Comparing Direct and Indirect Effects. - Using the FIML results, we can com-
 pare the relative importance of the direct and indirect effects in moving from having
 no new entrants to having an average level of entry (2.16 firms). This change directly
 induces mixed-technology incumbents to phase out an additional 0.92 analog and
 introduce an additional 0.92 digital plans. The incumbent's probability of adopting
 the digital technology also increases by 16.35 percentage points. Incumbent firms
 that transition from analog-only to mixed provider in turn introduce 3.24 digital
 plans and an additional 1.10 analog plans. Therefore, in expectation, entry indi-
 rectly causes a firm to introduce an additional 0.53 digital and 0.18 analog plans.14
 This represents a substantial indirect effect on marketing the new technology and
 highlights the role of technology choice as a second avenue through which market
 structure affects firms' nonlinear pricing strategies.
 14 A similar calculation for transition to a digital-only provider yields a direct effect of 0.12 and an expected
 indirect effect of 0.52 plan introductions.
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 Our technology adoption results are of independent interest as they are consistent
 with theoretical predictions. In the Appendix, we consider a model of strategic tech-
 nology adoption in the spirit of Fudenberg and Tiróle (1986). Anticipating future
 entry by PCS firms, the cellular incumbent chooses the optimal time to introduce
 digital service, which we model as a product innovation. In contrast to Fudenberg
 and Tiróle (1986), we focus on entrants who have pre-committed to digital tech-
 nology, eliminating a strategic deterrence motive in the incumbent's decision. The
 model predicts that the incumbent's adoption timing hinges on the sensitivity of
 its post-entry profits to its decision. If increased competition from additional firms
 dramatically reduces the incumbent's profits from the old technology relative to
 those from the new, it is more likely to adopt before entry occurs. Our empirical
 results thus suggest that the onset of PCS competition has a greater adverse effect on
 incumbents' profits from analog service than on those from digital offerings. This
 is probably because of the fast consumer uptake of digital service discussed earlier
 and is likely the case in information and communications services industries more
 broadly. In these industries, revenues from new technologies tend to quickly over-
 take those from old, and the price of old technologies is more sensitive to increased
 competition than the price of new.
 These results are also consistent with those of Barton H. Hamilton and Brian
 McManus (2005) that firms in competitive markets are more likely to have adopted
 a new technology earlier than those in monopoly markets. Together our papers pro-
 vide a complementary picture of the role of technology adoption in firm behavior.
 While we focus on how technology adoption affects adopters' pricing, their work
 focuses on how it affects adopters' market shares and ability to deter entry.15
 B. Effect on Plan Placement
 Our results so far demonstrate that entry led to finer price discrimination as mea-
 sured by plan family size. Since the size on its own does not provide information
 about which types of consumers are targeted with different plans, we now test the
 effect of entry on calling plan placement across the usage spectrum. We find that, with
 more entry, firms spread their plans more evenly over the usage spectrum for most
 plan types. This is consistent with business-stealing overpowering the firm's incentive
 to differentiate under increased competition. This result reinforces the plan change
 results by confirming that they are not due to counting very similar plans as distinct.
 To measure plan placement and clustering, we use a Herfindahl index based on
 the share of minutes "allocated" to each plan, which, once normalized, is compa-
 rable across plan families. While it would be useful to compare the plan variety
 observed in our data with that predicted by theory, this is not possible given the
 current theoretical literature. Instead, we rely on this descriptive measure of plan
 placement across markets in the same industry so that we can relate it to market
 15Hannan and McDowell (1984), Karshenas and Stoneman (1993), Sharon Oster (1982), and Nancy L. Rose
 and Paul L. Joskow (1990) investigate the effect of firm characteristics on adoption speed. Apart from firms' geo-
 graphic scope, we cannot examine this question because firms' subscriber bases, revenues, and network sizes by
 market are unavailable.
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 structure while controlling for the possibility that placement might depend on het-
 erogeneous consumer preferences across markets.
 We assume that the total allocable minutes within a plan family equals the larg-
 est allowance on any plan within the family.16 We define the minutes allocated to a
 plan as the difference between the plan's allowance and the closest smaller allow-
 ance in the plan family (or zero for the first plan). For example, if a plan family
 includes two plans with allowances of 300 and 500 minutes, the Herfindahl index
 is ((500 - 300)/500)2 + ((300 - 0)/500)2 = 13/25. For a plan family with n
 plans, the Herfindahl index ranges from a value of '/n if all plans are equally spaced
 to a value of 1 if all plans are identical.
 To make the Herfindahl index comparable across different-sized plan fami-
 lies, we normalize it by dividing by the Herfindahl that results from equal spac-
 ing of plans (l/n). In our example above, the normalized Herfindahl is (13/25)/
 (1/2) = (26/25) . For a plan family with n plans, the normalized Herfindahl ranges
 from one, if all plans are equally spaced, to n, if all plans are identical. The top panel
 of Table 5 provides summary statistics, using both entrants' and incumbents' 1998
 offerings, which increases the number of observations to 521 plan families.
 Econometric Model - We use a setup similar to the plan change model and spec-
 ify the firms' choices of plan placement as:
 (8) NormHHIimt = aH + ß?Prov_Techim + ß%Plan_Typeim
 + ß^ProvSechim){Planjrypeim)(Entrantsm)
 + ß>4 X/m + £/mř
 ■= fH'aH вн Z?l + £?
 where NormHHIimt is the normalized Herfindahl index of plan placement in 1998.
 We employ levels instead of heterogeneity measures for the demographic variables
 to capture how overall demand affects firms' choices of plan spacing. We again esti-
 mate the system of equations (3), (5), and (8) using FIML, accounting for the simul-
 taneous choice of technology adoption and market entry. The Appendix describes
 the adjustments made to the estimation procedure to reflect the continuous nature of
 the normalized Herfindahl measure that replaces the discrete plan change variable.17
 Direct and Indirect Effects. - Competition has a significant and negative direct
 effect on the normalized Herfindahl index for the majority of plan family types. These
 16 As a robustness check, we replicate our results using as a measure of allocable minutes the number of minutes
 for which a particular plan represents the cost-minimizing option in the plan family. The disadvantage of this mea-
 sure relative to the allowance-based measure is that it requires an assumption about consumers' maximum usage.
 To check the sensitivity of the results to this assumption, we estimate assuming a maximum usage of either 1,000
 or 2,000 minutes. The results are similar to those in Table 6 in both magnitude and significance of the coefficients
 regardless of the assumption of maximum usage.
 17 We do not include entrants' choice of technology in estimating equation (3) since entrants pre-commit to the
 digital technology.
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 Table 5 - Summary Statistics, Allowance-Based Plan Placement Measures, Incumbents' and
 Entrants' 1998 Plans
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations
 Full menu of plans
 Herfindahl, families with 5-7 plans 0.358 0.108 0.193 0.789 335
 Normalized Herfindahl, all plan
 families 1.936 0.708 1.000 5.868 521
 "High-usage " and "low-usage " plans
 Share of plans above median,
 all plan families 0.553 0.214 0.000 1.000 521
 Normalized Herfindahl above
 median, all plan families 1.325 0.390 1.000 3.021 504
 Normalized Herfindahl below
 median, all plan families 1.709 0.536 1.000 5.149 488
 results, shown in the left-hand columns of Table 6, are also economically significant.
 As a share of the mean across all plan families, an additional competitor decreases
 the normalized Herfindahl by 9.40 percent for analog-only providers, 6.03 percent
 for digital-only, and 4.83 percent for analog plans offered by mixed-technology
 providers. The one exception is digital offerings by mixed-technology providers
 which become more clustered in response to additional competition: an addi-
 tional competitor increases the normalized Herfindahl by 5.81 percent. In general,
 increased competition leads firms to spread plans more evenly across the usage
 spectrum, increasing plan variety.
 The indirect effect of competition leads firms to increase plan variety for all plan
 types. For a given number of entrants, the digital plan families offered by mixed or
 digital-only providers exhibit less clustering than the analog offerings. Therefore,
 by raising the probability of digital adoption, additional competition results in firms
 offering greater plan variety. For providers that transition from analog-only to offer-
 ing both technologies, the normalized Herfindahl index declines by 0.25 (12.69
 percent of the mean) for analog plan families and by 2.29 (118.36 percent of the
 mean) for digital. For these plan family types, the indirect effects reinforce the direct
 effects. For a provider that transitions to digital-only offerings, the decrease in the
 normalized Herfindahl is 1.31 (67.84 percent of the mean), offsetting the direct
 effects of competition.
 Evaluated at the mean level of entry, the direct effects are larger in absolute mag-
 nitude than the indirect effects for both mixed and digital-only providers. For mixed
 providers, the average increase in the number of competitors entails a direct reduc-
 tion of 0.20 in the normalized Herfindahl index for analog plan families and a direct
 increase of 0.24 for digital plan families. Accounting for the increased likelihood
 of digital adoption at the mean level of entry, indirect effects are negligible for ana-
 log plan families and a decrease of 0.07 in the normalized Herfindahl for digital
 families. A similar calculation for transition to a digital-only provider yields a direct
 effect of -0.25 and an expected indirect effect of -0.04.
 Robustness. - To test the robustness of our results to the plan placement measure,
 we re-estimate using the non-normalized Herfindahl index and restricting the sample
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 Table 6 - Placement of Incumbents' and Entrants' 1998 Pricing Plans Based on Allowance Levels:
 FIML Estimation
 Normalized Herfindahl all 1998 Herfindahl, 1998 plan families
 plan families with 5-7 plans
 Standard Standard
 Coefficient error Coefficient error
 Provider and plan characteristics
 Prov_Analog -0.732** 0.2627 0.086* 0.0661
 Prov_Mixed -0.978** 0.2154 -0.131** 0.0516
 Plans_Digital -1.313** 0.1715 -0.014 0.0365
 Entrant_YN 0.355** 0.1456 0.034 0.0340
 Market structures (IT)
 Prov.Analog x Competitors -0.182** 0.0687 -0.043** 0.0207
 Prov_Digital x Competitors -0.117** 0.0519 -0.012 0.0161
 Prov_Mixed x Plans_Analog x Competitors -0.093** 0.0568 0.013 0.0184
 Prov_Mixed x Plans_Digital x Competitors 0.113** 0.0544 0.008 0.0174
 Market characteristics
 %withBA -0.023 0.0239 -0.007* 0.0052
 Commuting time -0.328** 0.0796 -0.013 0.0127
 Population 0.010** 0.0020 0.001* 0r0005
 Household income -0.042 0.0588 -0.050** 0.0155
 SD,rferf 0.551** 0.0211 0.085** 0.0042
 Log-likelihood -664.68 178.71
 Observations 521 335
 Notes: Provider fixed-effects included in plan variety and digital adoption decision equations. Provider-level clus-
 tered standard errors based on 50 bootstrapped samples. The estimated coefficients of the two auxiliary equations,
 with the corresponding bootstrap standard errors in parentheses, are for Specification I:
 ENTRANTS = 0. 158 POP - 0.002 POP2 + 0.072 AREA + 0. 100 %C0MM + 0.386 WRI + eE
 (0.0215) (0.0002) (0.0619) (0.0375) (0.1063)
 ADOPTION = 0. 157 ENTRANTS - 0.033 BAPLUS + 0.029 COMMUTE + 0.048 POP
 (0.1031) (0.0219) (0.0285) (0.0163)
 + 0.046 INCOME + 2.607 LARGE-SC + 1 .692 SMALL-SC + £D
 (0.0198) (0.3120) (0.2455)
 and for Specification II:
 ENTRANTS = 0. 1 13 POP - 0.001 POP2 + 0.068 AREA + 0.085 %C0MM + 0.393 WRI + eE
 (0.0344) (0.0003) (0.0956) (0.0696) (0.1365)
 ADOPTION = 0.258 ENTRANTS - 0.017 BAPLUS + 0.001 COMMUTE + 0.056 POP
 (0.2359) (0.0465) (0.0630) (0.0304)
 + 0.042 INCOME + 1.529 LARGE-SC +1.361 SMALL-SC + ?D
 (0.0388) (0.6143) (0.5707)
 The variables in the entrant equation are defined in Table 4. The estimated covariances {^de^ep^dpÍ же
 {0.003, 0.055, 0.001} and {-0.002, 0.105, -0.133} and the estimated variances {a2D,a2P} are {0.005, 0.109} and
 {0.249, 0. 153} for Specifications I and II, respectively.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
 ♦Significant at the 10 percent level.
 to plan families with five to seven plans. This reduces the number of observations to
 335. Summary statistics are in the top panel of Table 5 and the results are shown in
 the right-hand columns of Table 6. The results for plan families in single-technology
 offerings are directionally consistent with those using the full sample, although not
 as significant perhaps due to the reduced number of observations. For this sub-sam-
 ple, the average Herfindahl in markets without entry is equivalent to 2.79 equally
 spaced plans. The average level of entry increases this to 3.77 for analog plan
 VOL 3 NO. 2 SEIM AND VIARD: THE EFFECT OF MARKET STRUCTURE 239
 families. The results in mixed-technology offerings and for digital-only providers are
 not significant, possibly because the majority of the lost observations are for these.18
 С Heterogeneous Effects on Consumers
 Thus far we have found that entry increases the number of plans offered by
 incumbent firms and typically spreads these plans more evenly across the usage
 spectrum. We now test whether an increase in competition has a differential effect
 on high- versus low- valuation consumers. We find that firms respond to increased
 competition by increasing the number of plans targeted at customers whom their
 technologies best serve.
 To test the relative effect on high- valuation consumers, we classify calling plans
 into high- and low-usage. We designate a calling plan as "high-usage" if its allow-
 ance is greater than 180, the median allowance across all plans in our sample. We
 again include both entrants and incumbents to increase the number of observations
 and focus on levels since all entrants had zero plans in 1996. Summary statistics for
 three measures of plan mix (share of high-usage plans offered and the normalized
 Herfindahl indices among high-usage or low-usage plans) are displayed in the bot-
 tom panel of Table 5. As in our other models, we specify the firms' choices of plan
 mix as a function of the provider's technology type, the plan family's technology,
 and entry effects that vary by provider type and technology, and market demograph-
 ics. We use FIML to jointly estimate the determinants of the plan mix together with
 the determinants of adoption (equation 3) and of aggregate entry (equation 5).
 Relative Prevalence of High-Usage Plans. - Our primary measure is the share
 of high-usage plans in a plan family. We find that the share of high-usage plans
 increases significantly with the number of competitors for digital-only providers but
 decreases for mixed-technology providers. The results are shown in the left-hand
 columns of Table 7. The average share of high-usage plans is 55.30 percent. An
 additional competitor increases the share by 1.75 for digital-only providers, which
 includes both new PCS entrants and incumbents who fully replaced analog with
 digital offerings. This is a large effect given that the number of competitors ranges
 from two to six. For mixed-technology providers, the share is reduced by 2.25 for
 analog offerings and 3.42 for digital offerings.
 These results suggest that increased competition induces firms to use price
 discrimination differentially depending on their technology adoption choice.
 Incumbents and new entrants who use digital transmission technologies exclusively
 exploit the benefits of their increased network capacity by targeting high- valuation
 users. Providers that continue to offer at least some service on the more-constrained
 analog technology instead respond to more entry by increasing their share of plans
 targeted at low-valuation customers. Competition thus results in firms tailoring
 18 To ensure that our results are not sensitive to our specific choice of clustering measure, we re-estimated using
 a modified L-function index developed by Eric Marcon and Florence Puech (2003) for use in measuring industry
 agglomeration. We adapted the L-function index to our one-dimensional, linear setting rather than the circular set-
 ting needed in industry agglomeration. The results using the L-function index are qualitatively similar, and gener-
 ally stronger, than the estimates using the Herfindahl index.
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 Table 7 - Placement of High-Usage Plans, Incumbents' and Entrants' 1998 Pricing Plans: FIML
 Estimation
 Share of plans Normalized Herfindahl Normalized Herfindahl
 above median above median below median
 Standard Standard Standard
 Coefficient error Coefficient error Coefficient error
 Provider and plan characteristics
 Prov.Analog 0.468*** 0.087 0.099 0.171 -0.265* 0.202
 Prov.Mixed 0.206*** 0.055 -0.082 0.129 -0.353** 0.189
 Plans_Digital 0.377*** 0.055 -0.173* 0.117 -0.408** 0.209
 Entrant_YN -0.195*** 0.025 -0.075* 0.051 0.598*** 0.131
 Market structure
 Prov.Analog x Competitors -0.013 0.015 -0.140*** 0.028 0.008 0.036
 Prov_Digital Competitors 0.017* 0.012 -0.042** 0.020 -0.095*** 0.030
 Prov_Mixed x Plans. -0.025** 0.013 -0.088*** 0.025 0.042 0.044
 Analog x Competitors
 Prov.Mixed x Plans. -0.034** 0.013 -0.007 0.023 0.016 0.039
 Digital x Competitors
 Market characteristics
 %withBA -0.005*** 0.001 0.011*** 0.003 0.003 0.003
 Commuting time 0.003** 0.002 -0.002 0.005 0.006** 0.004
 Population 3.4E-04 0.001 6.5E-05 0.001 -0.001* 0.001
 Household income 0.004** 0.002 -0.008*** 0.002 0.004 0.005
 SD,7/y 0.143*** 0.004 0.321*** 0.009 0.431*** 0.024
 Log-likelihood 87.10 -335.35 -474.19
 Observations 521 504 488
 Notes: Provider fixed-effects included in plan variety and digital adoption decision equations. Provider-level clus-
 tered standard errors based on 50 bootstrapped samples. The estimated coefficients of the auxiliary equations with
 the corresponding bootstrap standard errors in parentheses are for Specification I:
 ENTRANTS = 0. 145 POP - 0.002 POP2 + 0.058 AREA + 0.102 %C0MM + 0.368 WRI + eE
 (0.0225) (0.0002) (0.0356) (0.0263) (0.0976)
 ADOPTION = 0.231 ENTRANTS - 0.038 BAPLUS + 0.027 COMMUTE + 0.048 POP + 0.031 INCOME
 (0.1157) (0.0234) (0.0303) (0.0149) (0.0200)
 + 2.264 LARGE-SC +1.735 SMALL-SC + £D,
 (0.4054) (0.4544)
 for Specification II:
 ENTRANTS =0.166 POP -0.002 POP2 + 0.061A/ŒA +0.123 %C0MM +0.410 WRI + eE
 (0.0308) (0.0003) (0.0558) (0.0403) (0.1090)
 ADOPTION = 0. 161 ENTRANTS - 0.035 BAPLUS + 0.030 COMMUTE + 0.051 POP + 0.048 INCOME
 (0.1966) (0.0264) (0.0454) (0.0266) (0.0229)
 + 2.788 LARGE-SC + 2.462 SMALL-SC + £D,
 (0.7410) (0.5434)
 and for Specification III:
 ENTRANTS = 0. 168 POP - 0.002 POP2 + 0.058 AREA + 0.089 %COMM + 0.455 WRI + eE
 (0.0257) (0.0003) (0.0719) (0.0415) (0.1150)
 ADOPTION = 0. 157 ENTRANTS - 0.051 BAPLUS + 0.008 COMMUTE + 0.061 POP + 0.046 INCOME
 (0.1442) (0.0185) (0.0267) (0.0180) (0.0158)
 + 2.419 LARGE-SC + 1.956 SMALL-SC + f.
 (0.5509) (0.4995)
 The variables are defined in Table 4. The estimated covariances {jde^ep^dp} are {-0.027, 0.123, 0.008}, {0.091,
 -0.038, -0.036}, and {0.020, 0.103, -0.014} for Specifications I- III. The estimated variances {a2D,a2P} are
 {0.082, 0.098}, {0.049, 0.076}, and {0.024, 0.045} for Specifications I-III.
 *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
 * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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 their offerings to the customer group whose demand is best served by their chosen
 technology.
 Entry also has a significant indirect effect on the share of high-usage plans.
 For a mixed provider, the share of digital plans above the median is 58.34 percent
 and for a digital-only provider 37.70 percent. This compares to 46.85 percent for
 analog-only plan families. Therefore, transitioning to a mixed provider indirectly
 increases the share of plans above the median while transitioning to a digital-only
 provider decreases it.
 We can also compare the relative importance of the direct and indirect effects for
 a mixed-technology provider at the average level of entry. Entry directly decreases
 the share of plans above the median by 5.45 percentage points for analog and by
 7.38 percentage points for digital families. Incorporating the predicted probability
 of adoption at the mean level of competition, the indirect effects decrease the share
 of analog plans by 2.37 percentage points and increase the share of digital plans by
 5.28 percentage points.19
 Robustness. - To ensure that the plans targeting high-(low-)valuation consumers
 are distinct, we also employ a Herfindahl index, normalizing it by the index if all
 plans above (below) the median were equally spaced. For plans above the median,
 we base the Herfindahl index on the spectrum of minutes from the allowance just
 below the median (180 minutes) to the largest allowance within the plan family.
 For example, consider a plan family with plans having allowances of 50, 100, 200,
 and 500 minutes. There are two plans with above-median allowances and (500-
 100) minutes, or 400 minutes, of allocable usage. The resulting Herfindahl index is
 ((500 - 200)/400)2 + ((200 - 100)/400)2 = 5/8. To normalize the Herfindahl
 we divide by 1/2, the Herfindahl if the two plans above the median were equally
 spaced, to obtain a normalized Herfindahl of 5/4. Theoretically, this measure ranges
 from a minimum of 1 when high-usage plans are equally spaced, to n, when all n
 high-usage plans are identical.20 In our data, it ranges from 1.00 to 3.02. Similarly,
 for plans below the median we base the Herfindahl index on the spectrum of minutes
 from zero to the allowance just above the median (180 minutes), which ranges from
 1.00 to 5.15 in our data. The econometric specification is that given by equation (8),
 using the normalized Herfindahl indeces for high and low usage plans in place of the
 original measure for the full usage spectrum.
 The results using the normalized Herfindahl above the median are shown in the
 middle columns of Table 7. Entry has a negative and significant direct effect for all
 plan family types except digital-only. Relative to the average normalized Herfindahl
 above the median across all plan families (1.33), each additional competitor reduces
 the normalized Herfindahl by 3.14 to 10.59 percent, depending on the plan family
 and provider type. The indirect effect of competition is negative but not economically
 significant. We thus find that high-usage plans are more distinct with more entry.
 19 A similar calculation for transition to a digital-only provider yields a direct increase of 3.78 and an expected
 indirect increase of 3.41 percentage points.
 20The Herfindahl in the numerator is undefined when there are no high- (low-) usage plans. This accounts for
 the seventeen (thirty-three) observations we lose when using these measures.
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 The results for the normalized HHI below the median are shown in the right-hand
 columns of Table 7. Entry has a negative and significant direct effect for digital-only
 plan families. Each additional competitor reduces the normalized Herfindahl by
 5.56 percent of the normalized Herfindahl below the median across all plan families
 (1.71). The direct effects for other plan types are not significant. The indirect effects
 of competition are statistically significant but economically small. Incorporating the
 predicted probability of adoption at the mean level of entry, the indirect effect reduces
 the normalized Herfindahl below the median by 1.97 percent for mixed-digital, 1.06
 percent for digital-only providers, and 0.23 percent for analog-only providers as a
 percentage of the average normalized Herfindahl below the median (1.71). We thus
 find that low-usage plans are more distinct with more entry for digital-only provid-
 ers and slightly more distinct with more entry for mixed-digital providers.
 D. Effect on Price Levels
 Since competition significantly alters the nonlinear pricing practices of cellular
 firms this raises the question of how price levels are affected overall and across
 different consumers. We follow the approach of Busse and Rysman (BR) (2005)
 to assess the effect of competition on quantity discounting.21 This is equivalent to
 measuring the response in price-cost ratios to changes in competition if, as is likely
 in our setting, the marginal cost of providing service to low- versus high- valuation
 customers does not vary with competition. Overall, we find that increased competi-
 tion results in greater price reductions for high-usage consumers.
 Econometric Model - BR suggest testing whether the price schedule's curvature
 changes with the number of competitors. We follow their approach in specifying the
 log price charged by provider i for q¿ minutes of service on technology t, Pijmt, as:
 (9) HPijmt) = <*imt+ ßimtln(<lj) + £ijm»
 where a imt captures differences in cost or demand levels across providers and mar-
 kets and /?/w,the curvature of the price schedule. A value of one for ßimt corresponds
 to linear pricing, ßimt< 1 to quantity discounting, and ßimt> 1 to quantity premia.
 To estimate equation (9), we construct a grid of usage levels in ten-minute incre-
 ments. For each plan family, we compute the minimum total price at each grid point
 across all calling plans in the family, thus constructing the lower envelope of prices.
 The underlying assumption, as in Miravete and Roller (2004), is that consumers
 choose the optimal plan for their usage. We bound the usage grid at 1,000 minutes.
 Individual-level usage data for 1999 and 2000 obtained from TNS Telecoms indi-
 cate a usage level of 985 minutes for the 99th percentile of consumers. Since our data
 cover an earlier period, a cutoff of 1,000 minutes represents a reasonable estimate
 for maximum usage. Our results are robust to using a 2,000-minute cutoff.
 21 In related work, McManus (2007) provides empirical evidence for the "no distortion at the top" prediction of
 theoretical models of nonlinear pricing.
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 Table 8 - Distribution of Estimated Curvature of Incumbents' and
 Entrants' 1998 Pricing Schedules
 Analog plans, Digital plans,
 incumbents incumbents Entrants
 Mean 0.627 0.444 0.486
 SD 0.093 0.109 0.099
 Min 0.402 0.167 0.197
 Max 0.920 0.837 0.844
 Percentiles:
 5 percent 0.465 0.260 0.282
 25 percent 0.560 0.404 0.438
 50 percent 0.640 0.432 0.483
 75 percent 0.689 0.492 0.552
 95 percent 0.774 0.653 0.616
 Average adjusted R2 0.946 0.872 0.903
 Observations 178 128 215
 We use a two-stage procedure. We first obtain the price schedule parameters a
 and ß for every technology-provider-market combination by separately estimating
 equation (9) for each plan family using OLS. This generates a distribution of esti-
 mates for a and ß based on 521 plan families, summarized in Table 8. All plan
 families exhibit quantity discounting, with digital plan families exhibiting more dis-
 counting than analog. In the second stage, we follow BR in assessing how the esti-
 mated curvature of the pricing schedule changes with competition by estimating:22
 (10) Betaimt = ac + ßcxProv_Techim + ßc2Plan_Typeim
 + ßC(Prov_Techim)(Plan_Typeim)(Entrantsm) + ß^Xfm + Çg,
 EE/^./ř.zy + *£*-
 We augment equation (10) with our adoption and entry equations, equations (3) and
 (5), in a system-of-equations FIML.
 Direct and Indirect Effects. - The results, shown in Table 9, suggest that the increased
 plan variety for high-usage customers is associated with lower prices.23 Competition
 directly increases analog pricing schedule by 0.09 and introduces a digital pricing
 schedule that has a much greater curvature (by 0.40) than the original analog pric-
 ing schedule. Firms transitioning to full digital increase the magnitude of quantity
 22 Our estimation of the second stage departs from BR's procedure. They incorporate the estimated standard
 deviation of the residuals of each plan family's price-quantity regression into an FGLS procedure using all price
 observations. The FGLS procedure does not control for the endogeneity of entry as BR acknowledge, resulting in
 upper-bound estimates of competition's effect on curvature. FGLS estimates using our data were consistent with a
 range of responses to entry from quantity discounting to premia.
 23 We verified that prices fall overall with increased competition. We regressed the minimum price for 180 min-
 utes of usage for all plan families in 1996 and 1998 on the same variables as in equation (10) plus a year dummy.
 Prices fall with entry, although not all the coefficients are significant. The results are robust to using 2SLS to control
 for endogeneity of entry and to using minimum prices at 500 minutes.
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 Table 9 - Curvature of Incumbents' and Entrants'
 1998 Pricing Schedules: FIML Estimation
 Standard
 Coefficient error
 Provider and plan characteristics
 Prov_Analog -0.076* 0.057
 Prov_Mixed -0.167** 0.032
 Plans_Digital -0.230** 0.033
 Entrant_YN 0.001 0.028
 Market structure
 Prov_Analog x Competitors -0.026** 0.011
 Prov_Digital x Competitors -0.022** 0.010
 Prov_Mixed x Plans_Analog x Competitors 0.003 0.011
 Prov_Mixed x Plans_Digital x Competitors 0.011 0.011
 Market characteristics
 % with BA -0.002* 0.001
 Commuting time 0.003** 0.002
 Population -3.5E-04 0.000
 Household income 0.003** 0.001
 SD, rfurv 0.087** 0.037
 Fixed effects Provider level
 Log-likelihood 339.41
 Observations 521
 Notes: Provider fixed-effects included in plan curvature and digital adoption decision equations. Provider-level
 clustered standard errors based on 50 bootstrapped samples. The estimated coefficients of the two auxiliary equa-
 tions, with the corresponding bootstrap standard errors in parentheses, are:
 ENTRANTS = 0. 169 POP - 0.002 POP2 + 0M0AREA + 0.1 12 %C0MM + 0.421 WRI + eE
 (0.0330) (0.0003) (0.0783) (0.0523) (0.1610)
 ADOPTION = 0. 127 ENTRANTS - 0.044 BAPLUS - 0.050 COMMUTE + 0.063 POP
 (0.1849) (0.0265) (0.0418) (0.0276)
 + 0.056 INCOME +235SLARGE-SC + 1.862 SMALL-SC + ?
 (0.0209) (0.3594) (0.4659)
 The variables are defined in the footnote to Table 4. The estimated covariances {crDEi aEP, aDP} are
 {0.008, 0.062, -0.016}. The estimated variances {оЪ,(т2р} are {0.041, 0.014}.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
 ♦Significant at the 10 percent level.
 discounting, especially analog- and digital-only providers. An additional firm in the
 market decreases the curvature of the nonlinear pricing schedule by 0.03 for analog-
 only providers and 0.02 for digital-only providers, relative to an average curvature
 of 0.63 and 0.48, respectively. Competition also has a significant indirect effect on
 quantity discounting. Transitioning from an analog to a mixed provider decreases
 the curvature of the digital pricing schedule to 0.23 below that of an analog-only
 provider.
 III. Conclusion
 Firms in communications and information services industries usually market their
 products using nonlinear pricing plans and frequently introduce new generations of
 services. How market structure affects these interdependent choices is assessed by two
 relevant but distinct strands of literature: one focused on market structure's effect on
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 product diffusion and another on its effect on second-degree price discrimination. We
 empirically estimate market structure's joint effect on adoption and pricing to quantify
 their relative effects. We examine the effect of entry on firms' pricing responses in the
 context of new technology diffusion. Our setting allows us to control for unobservable
 determinants of both the market structure and the behaviors of interest. We find eco-
 nomically significant effects of market structure on both adoption and pricing.
 Our results are consistent with lower concentration speeding up technology adop-
 tion and stimulating marketing of the technology. Incumbents in markets with more
 competitors are more likely to transition from analog to digital transmission technolo-
 gies. This is consistent with cellular incumbents anticipating that significant entry of
 digital competitors would largely eliminate the market for analog service. This incen-
 tive exceeded that of waiting until the cost of deploying the technology fell further.
 Lower concentration is also associated with firms marketing the new technology
 more aggressively by offering more plans and spreading their plans more evenly
 across the usage spectrum. This is consistent with firms' increased incentive to "fill
 the calling plan space" and steal customers when facing a larger set of competitors.
 Prices decline most for high- volume customers.
 Our results on the interaction between firms' pricing strategies and technology
 adoption suggest the need for a more detailed analysis of the effect of technology
 adoption on subscribers' usage choices and therefore consumer welfare. Usage data
 would also allow a more detailed analysis of competition's effect on the nonlinear
 pricing plans available to different customer types and therefore a welfare assess-
 ment of the effect of plan variety.
 Appendix
 A. Adoption Model
 In this Appendix, we derive conditions that determine an incumbent's technology
 adoption decision in the face of entry by n competitors who have pre-committed
 to adopting a new technology.24 We tailor a subgame of the Fudenberg and Tiróle
 (henceforth FT) (1986) model to analyze whether an incumbent chooses to adopt at
 a time tu before the entrants' pre-committed adoption time t2, or to adopt only after
 entry at a time ¿3, continuing to use the pre-existing technology in the meantime.25
 We apply the model to information and communications services industries, such
 as cellular services, which share the following characteristics. First, competition in
 these industries can be regarded as differentiated Bertrand since output can be changed
 easily once capacity is set and marginal costs are nearly zero in the absence of capac-
 ity constraints. Second, most innovations in these industries are product rather than
 24 In addition to being unable to deter entry, the incumbents' ability to delay entry in our setting is also limited
 since the FCC required PCS license holders to meet specific coverage requirements within a five-year time window
 to maintain their licenses.
 5 As in FT, we derive the equilibrium for a single incumbent to simplify the exposition. We can extend their
 setup to two incumbents and n pre-committed entrants, allowing the incumbents to pre-empt each other strategically
 in their adoption timing of a cost-reducing innovation. We have chosen not to do so here to focus attention on the
 incumbent's reaction to entry.
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 process innovations since marginal production costs are nearly zero.26 Finally, in these
 industries, post-entry profits under the old technology are usually more adversely
 affected by entry than those under the new technology, as we discuss below. Given
 these assumptions, we find that the incumbent's propensity to adopt prior to entry
 increases in the number of entrants, at least when faced with many entrants.
 If the incumbent adopts at time t before entry, the net present value of its future
 profits is:
 nt nt2 ЛОО
 (Al) Vx = UIoe~rxdx+ U[e~rxdx+ I Ufe"* dx - f(t)e-rt,
 Jo Jt Jt2
 where Uq denotes the incumbent's flow profits on the old technology before entry,
 Ili the incumbent's flow profits on the new technology before entry, and Ilf the
 incumbent's flow profits on the new technology after entry. As in FT, we assume
 that По < ní. f[i) denotes the one-time cost of adopting the technology, which is
 decreasing and convex in the adoption time. The optimal time of adoption, ti9 occurs
 when:
 (A2) /, = min(r2,/ : - (Hi - Ufa-« - 4^il = 0).
 If, on the other hand, the incumbent adopts after entry occurs, the net present value
 of its future profits is:
 nt2 pt лоо
 (A3) V3 = UIoe~rxdx+ Il$e-rxdx+ I иЕ{е~гх dx - f(t)e'n9 Jo Jt2 Jt
 where По is the incumbent's flow profit on the old technology after entry, and we
 assume that nf < nf . t3 is determined by:
 (A4) t3 = тах(м : - (nf - П£)*"" - ^^ ^ = o).
 Simplifying, we get:
 (A5) V, = 1-^П£ + «"* -¿«"V, + ^nf - f{tx)e-*, and
 26 Although the digital technology reduces the cost of providing cellular services through better capacity man-
 agement, such cost reductions are largely unaffected by the number of competitors. In contrast, FT assume that the
 innovation reduces costs.
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 The incumbent adopts prior to entry when V{ - V3 > 0. We can now determine
 how the number of entrants, n, affects the incumbent's adoption decision. The num-
 ber of entrants affects only the incumbent's flow profits after entry, По and Ilf . In
 turn, Ц adjusts according to equation (A4). Changes in the number of entrants alter
 whether the incumbent adopts before or after the entrants, depending on the sign of:
 ¿(v, - v3) _ le-- ^Unf-nS)
 v J dn ' r I dn
 Therefore, if the incremental flow profits from adopting subsequent to entry increase
 in the number of entrants, ¿/(Ilf - nf)/rfn > 0, then additional entry makes it
 (weakly) more likely that the incumbent adopts prior to entry.
 Let Pq (n) be the price of the incumbent's old-technology service andpf(n) be the
 incumbent's price of new-technology service. The incumbent's price for new-tech-
 nology service declines directly with the number of rivals and for old-technology
 service indirectly since the two services are substitutes, so that dp^/dn, dp^/dn < 0.
 Let ql{Po{n),p^{n),n) and q^(P'(n),n) denote demand faced by the incumbents
 for usage on the old and new technologies, respectively.28 Then we can decompose
 the effect of entry on incremental flow profits as:
 d(nf - ng) dp* (dq' dpf dtf) dpi E
 _ JméeI + ^ M 4. ^ ¿fri dpi
 P0[dpf dn + ^ dn 4. ^ dpi dn ■
 This expression simplifies to:
 (A8)
 + , LEdqEx - nEdqEo) + , 'Pi~dn- - p°-dn-)>
 where e о is the elasticity of demand for the incumbent's old-technology service, ef
 is the elasticity of demand for the incumbent's new-technology service, £qi 1S the
 cross-price elasticity of demand between the two services, Rev^ is the incumbent's
 old-technology revenues, and /tevf is the incumbent's new-technology revenues.
 27 Note that the remaining terms in the derivative of (V, - V3) with respect to n equal zero since the incumbent
 chooses its post-entry adoption timing optimally.
 28 If the incumbent adopts the digital technology, consumers cannot substitute to the analog technology. In
 information and communications services, the new technology usually supplants the old.
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 Therefore, the incumbent is (weakly) more likely to adopt prior to entry when
 its post-entry demand for new-technology service exceeds or is more elastic than
 the demand for old-technology service. Adoption occurs (weakly) earlier when the
 price for new-technology service is more sensitive to the number of entrants than
 the price for old-technology service or the demand for the old-technology service
 is more sensitive to the number of entrants than demand for the new-technology
 service. Finally, the incumbent is (weakly) more likely to adopt prior to entry when
 its revenues from new-technology exceed those from old-technology service and the
 two services are not close substitutes.
 In information and communications services industries, there are a number of
 reasons why post-entry profits under the old technology are likely more adversely
 affected by entry than those under the new technology. In these industries, rev-
 enues from new services tend to quickly exceed those of previous technologies.
 As discussed in Section II, the number of subscribers to digital quickly overtook
 those to analog service, suggesting that analog-service demand declined signifi-
 cantly in the presence of even a few entrants. New entrants usually offer the latest
 technology, as they did in cellular services, suggesting that the price of the new
 service is more sensitive to the number of entrants than the price of the old service.
 Lastly, the elasticity of the incumbents' residual demand elasticity for the new
 service is likely greater than its residual demand elasticity on the old service, at
 least if it faces significant entry. In cellular services incumbents faced on average
 2.16 entrants.
 B. Estimation Procedure
 Our system-of-equation results rely on full information maximum likelihood esti-
 mators that maximize the likelihood:
 (A9) L=Y[Lm.
 m='
 In estimating the system of equations with the number of plan introductions as our
 dependent variable, the contribution to the likelihood from market m is:
 (AIO) Lm = Pr(Entrantsm = j,Digitalim = kh APlans imt = //řV/,ř),
 where j is an index of the number of entrants, k¿ equals one if firm i e {1,2, ...,/}
 implements the digital technology and zero otherwise, and lit indexes the change in the
 number of plans in firm /'s plan family for technology t G {analog, digital}. This equals:
 (All) Pr(Cf - f < el < Cf+l - fE,tfm < (2*, - l)/f,
 Cl-Â<iL< C{+ì -tf, Ví.ř),
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 where Cf is the cutoff f 017 entrants and Cp is the cutoff for a change of / in the number
 of plans offered. This probability is given by the integral of the 3/ + 1 -dimensional29
 normal distribution of f £,, ^pimt, and eEm with mean zero and variance-covariance
 matrix given by (I is the identity matrix and S is a matrix of all ones):
 аТУ^1х1 + I/x/ ^DP^lxli ^Dfl/xl
 (A12) E = ^DP^lIxì crpS2/x2/ + I2/X2/ aPE^2Ix' >
 aDE^'xI aPE^'x2I 1»
 ■ ■
over the surface defined by fD'fp and the cutoffs C^5 through Cp' and/£ and the
 cutoffs Cf through Cf that are consistent with the observed technology, cha ge in
plans offered, and number of entrants, respec ively. Th  arian e-c v rian e matr x
in equation (A12) allows for correlation i  the unobservable market shifters of he
adopti n, plan hange, and ent y equatio s, and thu con rols for the e og neity of
 m rket st ucture acro s qua io s.
The assum tion th t tf = eDm + r¡?m and £fw, = epm + r/fwř wit  rfim - N(0, 1)
d Vu t~N(0> 1) llow us to simplify the likelihood by integ a ing out r]f  and
rfimt . This resul s i :
 nCf+]-fE лоо лоо j
 (Al3)Lm=' Jcf-fE J-00 I J J-00 lítali [ Ч gpt(ep)U(eD^eE)deDdepdeE, J Jcf-fE J-00 J-00 /=1 [ Ч te{A,D} J
 where
 (A14) g?(eD) = Ф(/Р + eD)'l - *(f? + e*))1-*
 *Î(O = Ф(СЬг -К- e") - *(CÍ - fi - e"),
 and ф(е°, ep, eE) refers to the pdf of the divariate normal distribution of (eD, ep, eE)
 in equation (7). We further integrate e^ out of the likelihood, conditioning on e^ and
 epm to obtain:
 (A15) Lm = J j-00 J j-00 П L 'g?(eD) -;e{A)D} П iS(O j-00  /=1 L -;e{A)D} 'i
 x [Ф^,4С^ -ñ - *WÁcf -п}Ф(ео,ер)ае°аер,
 where Ф^^^ denotes the conditional cdf of sE, given realizations of eD and ep.
 29 This results from stacking the / adoption errors £?m, the 2/ technology-specific plan-change errors f £,, and the
 single market-level error eEm. The dimensionality of the plan change errors is less than 2/ in the data since not all
 firms offer both analog and digital plan families in all markets.
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 For the continuous plan variety measures, the likelihood of observing the firms'
 technology adoption and plan variety choices across plan technologies in market m
 becomes (where vit equals the observed variety measure for firm /'s plan family for
 technology t):
 (A16) Pr(Entrantsm = j,Digitalim = kh Variety >ш = vit Ví,í)
 = Pr(C/ -f<eEm< Cf+l - f' tf, < (Ib - 1)/Л ?ш = v, - fS).
 This entails only one modification of gft(sp) above, which now equals the standard
 normal pdf of r]fmt:
 (A17) gf^ď) = fa - ff, - e").
 For a given value of the parameters, we use simulation techniques to compute each
 market's contribution to the likelihood in equation (A 15) by integrating numerically
 over the bivariate normal distribution of eD and eř. We then use a numerical maxi-
 mization routine to maximize the full likelihood in equation (A9) and update the
 parameters until convergence.
 We assess parameter significance using bootstrap samples of 50 replications.
 We control for non-random clustering of unobservables by firm. For each bootstrap
 sample, we draw firms from the set in our sample and include the full set of plan
 families each firm offers across its market. We add firms until the number of obser-
 vations is at least as large as the number of observations in the actual dataset and
 the bootstrap sample contains at least one observation for each level of the discrete
 variables.
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